This article uses data drawn from Southeast Asia and West Africa to help explain the geographical distribution of foreign investment. Why during late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century globalization did the attributes of abundant natural resources, mass migration and export expansion that attracted large foreign investment to the New World not similarly draw capital to the tropics? I argue that in a number of tropical countries, rich natural resources and cheap labour available through mass migration effectively substituted for foreign borrowing. At the same time, the dominant institution of colonialism throughout Southeast Asia and West Africa limited borrowing from abroad and helped to ensure that even for these resource-rich countries capital flows remained slight.
from continuing their study beyond 1914. The present article fills some of these gaps. It extends analysis into the interwar years and contributes to an understanding of globalization and post-1870 foreign investment by studying in comparative historical depth eight tropical countries of a particular type.
These countries provide the basis for a vent-for-surplus growth model developed by Myint (1958) and Findlay (1970 Findlay ( , 1995 and recently elaborated by Kelly (1997) . The model is appropriate to countries which, as part of globalization from the 1870s onwards, experienced rapid export expansion based on rich natural resources without alternative domestic use. Natural resources, in combination with cheap labour, could be transformed into exports with only minimal foreign investment (Drake, 1972; Lundahl, 1994, 2001 ). Vent-for-surplus areas in the eight Southeast Asian and West African countries, although typically labour-scarce, could call on a large supply of labour willing to work for not much above a subsistence wage.
Labour supply was through international immigration and internal migration. In the New
World, capital and natural resources combined as complements to fuel rapid export growth. I argue that in the eight Asian and African countries export expansion was similarly rapid, but relied on natural resources and nearby cheap labour. Capital flowed to the New World because it 'went where it was most profitable' (Clemens and Williamson, 2004, p. 333) . By contrast, a similar profitability did not obtain in the eight resource-rich Asia and Africa because in the production of export commodities, natural resources and labour were efficient substitutes for foreign capital. As part of the openness associated with late nineteenth and early twentieth century globalization, colonial governments did not, contrary to Lucas' (1990, p. 95) hypothesis, try to restrict investment to maximize rents. Metropolitan capital could have flowed to colonial Southeast Asia and West Africa in response to rich resources had this been profitable.
The article argues that there were two further, complementary reasons for restricted foreign investment in these resource-rich Asian and African countries, one geographical the other institutional. Both have as a starting point the importance of social overhead projects, notably railways, and government borrowing in international capital flows before the Second World War. First, unlike in much of the New World, a geography which facilitated water transport, especially in the Asian countries here considered, reduced pressure on governments to make a financial commitment to railways in the late nineteenth century, at a time when railways constituted the most important component of international investment. Second, the institution of colonialism and its associated preferences for light taxation and if possible small surpluses, or at least balanced budgets, severely circumscribed fiscal capacity. As a consequence, government borrowing for investment in social overhead projects was limited.
Geography, export expansion and government

Geographical realities
In the 1860s large parts of the tropics, notably in Southeast Asia and West Africa, were sparsely populated or even uninhabited.
1 Often the most natural resource rich areas within the eight countries were also the least settled because they were unattractive for settlement prior to a demand for the products that could be produced there. Globalization, since this new demand was an integral part of it, helped to define resource abundance. Tropical populations had no reason to migrate from traditional subsistence agriculture to pioneer frontier areas and engage in what quickly became monoculture until late nineteenth-century transport and communication developments linked the tropics to a world market. But once this linkage allowed international trade to provide an outlet, or 'vent', for the products in which resource abundant tropical regions had a comparative advantage, large-scale inward migration swiftly followed.
Migration and moving frontiers
1 Principal Southeast Asian exceptions to this in the eight countries considered were dense populations in Java (but not Indonesia's Outer Islands), north Vietnam in Indochina, and central Luzon in the Philippines. Close settlement also existed in a few districts of eastern Nigeria and in the north around Kano.
Along with resource abundance, two striking aspects of rapid tropical development between 1870 and the Second World War were mass migration, both within and across national boundaries, and the nearly identical technologies shared by small farmers, or 'peasants', and plantations. Both relied on traditional agricultural tools. In all of the tropics, only sugar, tea and oil palm were predominately plantation crops. Other tropical exports depended substantially, or even exclusively, on the enterprise of small farmers. Nor did mining necessarily require a departure from small-scale traditional techniques if mineral deposits were sufficiently rich and alluvial.
Dual economies developed in the tropics in conjunction with the new vent-for-surplus trade opportunities, and often a country's traditional sector largely supplied the migrants to work in the export sector. One of the 'great events' in recent African economic history began in 1892
in Ghana when migrants moved west from the Akwapim scarp to north-western Akwapim, and after 1900 to the practically uninhabited dense forests and swamps of southern Akim Abuakwa, to create, by 1911, the world's principal cocoa industry. Ghanaian migrants cleared the land themselves and built their own roads and bridges, relying on European merchants in Accra and other port cities only as a link to world markets (Hill, 1963, pp. 163-88) . During the inter-war years Ghana's cocoa industry, now drawing migrants from other West African countries, more than doubled in size (Szereszewski, 1965, pp. 57-58) . It accounted for 44% of world cocoa exports in 1926 -30 (United Kingdom, 1938 . In Nigeria rapid growth in agricultural exports, including cocoa, groundnuts and palm oil, came from small farms. Apart from offering these farmers 'a vent for their potential surplus production the foreigner [merchants and government] did next to nothing to alter the technological backwardness of the economy' (Helleiner, 1966, p. 12) .
In Southeast Asia, like Ghana and Nigeria, export expansion was characterized by settlement of a moving frontier (Findlay, 1995) . During the late nineteenth century Vietnam, Burma and Thailand emerged as the world's three great rice exporters. In Vietnam production centred in the six southern provinces of Cochinchina, or Nam Bo, and especially the Mein Tay region. Its resemblance to 'all the world's great deltas in that the boundaries between water and land are often indistinct' had previously discouraged settlement and rice cultivation depended on an incessant flow of migrants from Nam Bo's central and eastern provinces (Brocheux, 1995, pp. 2-58) . Export-led growth in the Philippines, which became the world's largest sugar exporter after Cuba, relied substantially on migration from densely populated coastal areas and Luzon's crowded centre. Until the 1920s, development in the Philippines' western Negros wilderness 'shared much in common with the global frontier phenomenon' (Larkin, 1993, p.60) . Similarly, Javanese migrants were important to the post-1870 transformation of the Outer Islands into the dynamic part of Indonesia's economy.
Export expansion combined with Southeast Asia's particular geography near India and China to give rise to mass immigration. Between 1881 and 1939 over 15 million Chinese and Indian immigrants came to Burma, Malaya and Thailand, more than these three countries' total 1881 population (Huff and Caggiano, 2007) . In the process of Asian globalization, China and India became 'hinterlands' of surplus labour sending workers to a 'centre' of land-surplus Southeast Asia where, in turn, economies were driven by new opportunities for international trade.
Internal migration was also important in the growth of both the Burmese and Thai rice economies. The rise of rice production in Lower (or southern) Burma crisscrossed by the Irrawaddy and its tributaries was particularly dramatic. After 1850 the availability of global markets led to the migration, at its height a 'rice rush', to the Irrawaddy Delta of peasants from Upper Burma. By 1930 10 million acres of swamp had been cleared and planted with rice through 'the sustained effort of millions of peasants working only with bullocks or buffaloes and the simple, locally-made ploughs and implements they had evolved in their own way over the centuries ' (Dobby, 1966, p. 173 ). Thailand's rice frontier, which boomed in the 1890s and 1900s, was reminiscent of the United States' wild west but lay geographically to the south where 'in every direction the land was cleared of the heavy jungle grass which afforded shelter to wild elephants' (Johnston, 1981, p. 111) . In the 1870s Malaya was sparsely populated, largely unmapped and 'land was so abundant and readily available that it had no value' (Gullick, 1985, p.59) . Chinese and Indian immigration furnished most of the labour that made Malaya the world's main supplier of both tin and rubber.
2.3 Production functions, self-financing development and development paths
None of the eight Southeast Asian and West African countries had much manufacturing; all depended on exporting just one or two primary commodities. Export staples included rubber, tin, rice, sugar and cocoa. Of these, the production functions of only sugar, plantation rubber and tin involved sizeable amounts of capital and more than a few, if any, skilled workers.
Moreover, until at least the early part of the twentieth century in the vent-for-surplus sectors of all eight tropical economies small, highly labour intensive production units were the rule. The Philippines moved more slowly to centralized, capital-intensive processing of sugar than any of the world's other main producers. Consequently, until after the end of the Spanish period (effectively 1900) in the Philippines sugar 'still was a matter of small landholdings, small mills, primitive methods, and fairly widespread participation in the fruits of production and export' (Spencer, 1954, p. 203 Small parcels of land were freely available to those willing to settle them. In the eight countries, colonial land policy, as opposed to economic or technical advantages, could have made largescale production the mode. As a rule, however, governments favoured small production units, encapsulated in a colonial rhetoric of the nobility of peasant cultivators or, in the Philippines, the ideal of the yeoman farmer (Hailey, 1938 (Hailey, , pp. 768-80, 868, 1649 Larkin, 1993, p. 68 ).
Labour to produce vent-for-surplus exports came from the traditional sector of dual economies or through international immigration at no more than the marginal product of subsistence agriculture (the opportunity cost of labour) plus some mark up to cover migration costs. Between the opening of large-scale international trade and the Second World War, in both Southeast Asia and West Africa long-term unskilled wages (real income) in the export sector remained more or less constant at about a shilling a day (Szereszewski, 1965, pp. 57-58, 138; Birmingham, 1960, p. 2; Helleiner, 1964, p. 231; Austin, 2005, p. 320; Runes, 1939, pp. 10-11, 31; Hlaing, 1964b, pp. 120-21; Feeny, 1982, pp. 18, 21, 132-33; Huff and Caggiano, 2007) . By contrast, the New World took its wage level not from subsistence agriculture but from the opportunity cost of much higher real incomes in the cities and industrial areas of Europe.
The production functions of vent-for-surplus economies like the eight in Southeast Asia and West Africa have typically been modeled with no separate capital constraint, since only simple tools and seeds are needed (Myint, 1958 and see the formal models of Helleiner, 1966, pp. 10-12 and Findlay, 1970, pp. 70-76) . Over a large range of production and for a considerable time, the ready availability of good quality land avoids diminishing returns as migrants push outwards the country's frontier. Furthermore, even when frontier land is no longer of the best quality it remains abundant and surplus to purely domestic economy requirements. Although in Burma good land was gone by 1900, it existed in Thailand and Malaya in the interwar years. Most of Sumatra and Borneo had, Bauer observed in 1948 (p. 69), 'almost unlimited land available'. The opportunity that foreign markets afforded to exploit underutilized resources set in train a process that, as Myint (1987, p. 121) stressed, stretched over 'many decades'.
In the Myint/Helleiner/Findlay models, the traditional (pre-vent-for-surplus trade) level of consumption is achieved with less than possible labour inputs. Potential output is 'lost' in preference to leisure. But the new, improved the new, improved terms of trade at which, with globalization and the opening of trade, Asian and African primary producers can now exchange their output for consumer goods (the newly available imports or 'inducement goods') raises the opportunity cost of leisure and so creates an incentive for greater labour inputs. In the eight tropical economies, that incentive proved catalytic because, as was remarked of Nigeria, 'the price of cocoa affords the only stimulus necessary to cultivation' (Stamp, 1938, p. 40) .
Expansion onto new land combined with mobilizable man hours of labour and more workers, added largely through domestic or international migration, led to rapid rises in output and transformed the Southeast Asian and West African countries into export economies.
Because the eight tropical countries could draw on a highly elastic supply of frontier land and large amounts of cheap labour, export expansion was largely self-financing. Much of initial investment by small farmers and miners consisted of their own and family labour time.
Necessary finance to buy seeds and simple tools to clear land came from personal savings or borrowing from traders, local shopkeepers and others. Once production was underway, the main need was for circulating capital or produced inputs (as opposed to fixed or durable inputs) which are used up in one period of production and include 'wage fund' advances paid to workers at the outset of the production cycle. The cycle was typically short -under a year for crops like rice and cocoa and even less for tin mining in Malaya. Finance was self-sustaining. Principal recouped and profits from one cycle provided finance for the next and, moreover, new capital to extend the export production frontier, so long as the rent created by clearing new land at least equaled the interest cost of the wage fund (Drake, 1972 (Drake, , 2004 Findlay and Lundahl, 2001 ).
Investment was likely to be productive since, as Bauer (2000, pp. 12-13) emphasizes, it was made by people with a direct interest in the returns and who, furthermore, supervised their own work effort.
Plantation agriculture, by contrast, required large amounts of capital to produce an identical crop to that of small farmers. Finance was necessary, not because of any difference in agricultural tools, but to feed and supervise a labour force while clearing land, planting crops, waiting several years (five for cocoa and seven for rubber) for them to bear, and then maintaining an estate and marketing its output. In Ghana, Ashanti family farms could establish an acre of cocoa for about a third of the cost of plantations (Ingham, 1981, p. 41) . Smallholders in Malaya and Indonesia with less than 15 acres brought rubber into bearing for as little as a twelfth of the capital outlay required to open a European estate (Figart, 1925; Bauer, 1948 , pp.
67-68).
A developmental problem for all vent-for-surplus economies is to move from production functions heavily dependent on more inputs of land and unskilled labour to self-sustaining economic growth. In the absence of substantial technological change but continued population growth and the end of surplus land, Lewis-Fei-Ranis surplus labour becomes evident. Unless the economy implements land-saving technical progress in the production of food, it must somehow produce manufactures locally to absorb productively the increase in population.
In the eight tropical economies the dominant development path, insofar as it was determined by production functions, was one of small, often family, economic units, and so more like America's nineteenth-century Midwest than the cotton and sugar-producing southern United States. Major developmental differences from the Midwest existed, however. These included an effectively limitless supply of cheap labour in the eight countries, the institution of colonial government, restricted infrastructure, minimal financial development, and no strong educational tradition.
Foreign investment patterns and investor requirements
There were two main reasons why in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries substantial international investment might have gone to the tropics. One was the exploitation of natural resources to produce commodities demanded by world markets. The other was lending for social overhead projects such as plant and equipment for railways, tramways, docks, telecommunications, and gas, electric and water works. In the years 1865 to 1914, social overhead investment, of which railways made up three fifths of the total, accounted for 61.8% of new issues raised on British stock exchanges. Investment flows from other major nineteenthcentury capital exporters followed the same pattern as Britain (Edelstein, 1982, pp. 37-38 (Atkin, 1977, pp. 130-31) .
In Argentina, the region of recent settlement most comparable to the eight tropical countries in its level of financial development, the embryonic nature and thinness of domestic financial markets necessitated foreign investment and left government chiefly to organize this (Davis and Gallman, 2001, pp. 721-22) . Likewise, in Southeast Asia and West Africa local capital markets lacked organization and depth. Railway construction and social overhead projects largely devolved to governments. Insofar as foreign investors, typically through joint stock companies, came forward, they almost invariably dealt through Southeast Asian and West
African governments and required, as for example with railway construction in Burma, heavy government finance and/or interest guarantees on investment (Shein, 1964, pp. 44-53) .
Geography and railways
During the seven decades before the Second World War, however, governments in the eight Southeast Asian and West African countries, although assuming the responsibility for social overhead projects, borrowed sparingly for this purpose. Above all, attitudes towards borrowing reflected the fiscal and monetary policies of colonial government. However, especially in the early stages of development until around 1905, a combination of geography and cheap labour also made low government borrowing compatible with a level of economic development judged to be satisfactory.
Between 1865 and 1914 railway expansion absorbed 42% of British capital exports (Stone, 1999, p.10 governments to resist a large commitment to railway investment and yet for these eight countries still to achieve rapid export expansion. 'It is a mistake', Hopkins (1973, p. 198) West Africa was less well favoured with opportunities for water transport than Southeast Asia and this made labour costs more critical. After observing that 'a developed infrastructure was not a precondition for the emergence of the major cash crops of Southeast Asia and West Africa', Bauer (1984, p. 30) explains that human and animal transport and long chains of commercial intermediaries were 'partial but effective substitutes' for expensive communication systems. Ghana's cocoa industry could at first develop without too much social overhead investment because the initial exporting region was near the coast and cheap labour made head porterage economical for up to fifty miles (Holmes, 1970, pp. 164-65; Ingham, 1981, pp. 34, 95) . As late as 1905 just 12% of Ghana's cocoa exports were taken to sea by railway (Kay, 1972, p. 20) . Railways were, however, needed for the inter-war spread of Ghana's cocoa industry (Austin, 2005, pp. 68, 78) and for the development of a northern Nigerian export economy (Helleiner, 1966, p. 14) . In inter-war Southeast Asia, governments hitherto able to avoid railway construction could then limit it due to the growth of motorized transport. Before the Second World War the norm was, as in Nigeria, to conduct government finance according to the 'orthodox and prudent tenets of British Colonial fiscal policy' (Helleiner, 1966, p. 232 ; see also Hopkins, 1973, pp. 198, 260 these are: that in a particular group of tropical countries abundant natural resources allowed rapid export expansion with only small amounts of foreign capital; and that although in these countries successful export economies would have permitted bigger capital inflows, colonial government precluded any such development. The argument that in a particular group of tropical countries foreign investment was not a precondition for export growth might normally be tested by using Granger causality to help establish precedence. A Granger test is, however, precluded by the nature of the data. Between 1865 and 1914 for the four of eight tropical countries for
Empirical analysis
Per capita exports and foreign investment
Cheap labour and economic efficiency
The international trade literature on the Leontief Paradox shows that natural resources and capital may be either complements or substitutes (Naya, 1967, pp. 567, 570 States' rice production. Coclanis and Komlos (1987) show that in Burma's late nineteenth century rice industry, efficiency, measured as total factor productivity, equalled that in the American south. In the interwar United States, large-scale rice production, labour saving devices and efficient milling were insufficient to overcome high American wages and create the competitive strength to challenge Southeast Asian producers in world export markets (Cole, 1927) . Similarly, apart from Africa's oil palm industry where expensive centralised processing gave an edge to plantations, for 'the other West African staples the comparative efficiency of peasant [small farmer] methods has not been seriously challenged' (Hancock, 1940, p. 200 ; see also Austin, 1996) . The main theme of Peter Bauer's (1948) famous study of the rubber industry is the greater efficiency of Southeast Asian smallholders than European plantations.
Composition of colonial borrowing
For the eight tropical countries to have received per capita foreign investment not too obviously at odds with their per capita exports, colonial governments would have had to borrow for social overhead projects including railways. Fully 75% of pre-1914 British foreign investment was in public utilities, government securities and railways, and this same proportion of lending took the form of debentures and preference shares (Stone, 1999, p. 23-24, 31) . The lumpiness of social overhead capital dictated portfolio investment (Edelstein, 1994a, pp. 177-82) . By contrast, foreign investment in Southeast Asia was, in the paucity of portfolio and government borrowing, the polar opposite of the New World pattern. In 1930 direct (as opposed to portfolio) investment, mainly in trading and finance, accounted between 78% and 96% of foreign capital in Southeast Asia with the exception of Thailand where the proportion was 57% (Callis, 1942, p. 108) . Comparable figures are lacking for Ghana and Nigeria but in West Africa as a whole portfolio lending had more of a role than in Southeast Asia (Hopkins, 1973, pp. 191-92) .
Tax ratios and fiscal policy
In a pre-Second World War world where governments organized the bulk of overseas borrowing, foreign investment was restricted by low tax ratios in most of Southeast Asia and West Africa and by the determination of colonial governments to avoid deficits. Table 2 million inhabitants. The combination of extremely low population and abundant resources also made the FMS, as Schwulst (1931, pp.43, 53, 58) observed, a 'special case' of quite high per capita government spending, although for Malaya as a whole this peculiarity moderated.
Lewis ' (1978, p. 218) observation that before the First World War tropical governments could do all they wanted for around 5% of GDP does not hold for all countries in Table 2 . But it applies to the majority before the war. Even afterwards colonial government horizons remained low. Although an alternative source of tax revenue might have been tariffs, colonial governments, at least until the 1930s, tended to keep these to a minimum. Four main considerations influenced the restrictive fiscal approach of colonial governments and with this limited capital imports from metropolitan countries. First, a fundamental tenet of colonial policy was that government revenue from taxes and other sources had to cover recurrent expenditures (Edelstein, 1994b, p. 210) . These expenditures including administration, police, defence and pensions, and in which wages and salaries loomed large, took the bulk of available revenues (Schwulst, 1931, p. 53; Helleiner, 1966, pp.23, 233; Hopkins, 1973, p. 191) . Low taxation, often in deference to European merchant lobbies (Kay, 1972, pp. 17-18, 26-28; Hlaing, 1973, pp. 4-5; Booth, 1998, p. 147) , and high standing expenditure commitments left little room for additional spending and circumscribed debt service capacity.
The second and third reasons were closely linked and seem to have had much greater importance than any rate of return analysis in determining whether to undertake capital projects.
One was that such capital spending as occurred had to be consistent with the usual aim of colonial governments to balance budgets over a short period of time and, if possible, run an overall surplus. Over the period 1900 -1939 all six Southeast Asian (but not the two West African) countries registered cumulative budget surpluses. The other reason was that government revenue moved with the value of international trade -also its largest single source -and wide fluctuations in commodity prices, not just over a few months but years, encouraged caution. With few exceptions orthodoxy prevailed. In the inter-war depressions of -22 and 1930 -32, only Malaya, Indonesia and Ghana (in 1920 found themselves with large fiscal deficits. During 1930-32 three of the eight countries had healthy surpluses of revenue over expenditure and none ran a deficit bigger than 14% of revenue for the three years. But narrowly commodity-based export economies and an aim of limiting borrowing gave little scope for error to be sure of balancing budgets.
Fourth, after the turn of the century each of the eight tropical economies except Indochina operated a strict, or colonial, currency board system. Under it the balance of payments almost entirely determined local money supply and this increased the risk for tropical governments of contracting fixed interest external debt if unwilling to countenance the counter measure of borrowing abroad. At times of commodity price falls, without capital inflows to offset lower export revenue and a resulting balance-of-payments deficit, interest repayments on debt would have magnified the currency board system's already considerable effect in forcing monetary-led deflation on tropical economies (Huff, 2003) .
Railways, infrastructure and colonial development
Did colonial rule really contribute to limiting investment in social overhead projects and so also foreign capital inflows to Southeast Asia and West Africa? To help answer this question, a counterfactual exists in those independent nations of Latin America which are directly comparable to Southeast Asia and West Africa in having strong links to the global market from the late nineteenth century onwards but different in having independent governments. Capital exports for infrastructure meant, above all, finance for railway expansion. Admittedly, differences in geography and ownership patterns make inexact any comparison of capital inflows to finance railways in the eight tropical countries and Latin America. But a major divergence in rail density between the colonial and politically independent areas would suggest a significant difference in government's role in infrastructure provision.
To test for such a difference Table 3 measures rail density as kilometers of track per 100,000 population for the eight colonies and eight export-oriented Latin American countries.
The latter include the mining region of the Andes (Chile, Bolivia and Peru), the tropical (Leff, 1982, vol. 1, pp. 19-20, 61; Bunge and Mata, 1931, pp. 152-59) , narrows the Southeast Asian and African divergence in primary education but does not eliminate it.
In the tropical economies, the Philippines excepted, the most important reason for the absence of mass education was the failure of governments to make this a priority. Educational provision was especially weak in colonial Africa where 'budgetary penury and the requirement of financial self-sufficiency' limited the expansion of education (Young, 1994, p. 168) . In And did the governments of Southeast Asia and West Africa in fact have to take the lead in social overhead investment for it to be undertaken? These issues are considered in turn.
It could be that little foreign investment went to the resource-rich tropics because few additional opportunities existed for the productive use of capital, foreign or domestic. Was it perhaps a good thing that the fiscal conservatism of colonial governments limited capital projects? Or, recalling that creditworthy governments could borrow at interest rates of only about 5%, might more development-oriented governments have identified social overhead projects that generated sufficient revenue to require, at most, no more than a small increase in the tax burden (Lewis, 1970, p. 36; Atkin, 1977, p. 145 fiscal revenues remained small and government expenditures for capital formation were severely constrained … It is truly remarkable how much the American administration was able to achieve with such limited resources. Nevertheless, the fiscal constraint effectively prevented it from undertaking a more extensive program of capital formation that would have paid handsome economic returns, and would have vastly improved the prospects for Philippine economic development during the independence period that followed World War II.
Areas identified as needing more spending included ports, irrigation, roads and public buildings.
For West Africa, Hopkins (1973, pp. 190-91) (Szereszewski, 1965, p. 110) . Few analysts of any of the eight countries would entirely disagree with the thrust of these remarks as applied to their particular colony before the Second World War, although variations occurred. In British colonies (four of the eight countries) the pattern was, as Helleiner (1966, p. 300 ) describes for Nigeria, of governments 'content simply to maintain order while providing a minimum of infrastructure and research facilities'. In its financial and developmental conservatism, Thailand was as British colonial as any of the four British colonies. Ingram (1971, p. 212) concludes that the Thai government failed to furnish essential public works of railways, power, electricity and irrigation; educational provision was 'seriously inadequate'. In all these regards the government's 'conservative monetary and fiscal policies became significant '. Feeny (1982, pp. 105-7) and Sompop (1989, pp. 176-78) demonstrate, for irrigation and railways respectively, that more Thai government investment would have easily paid for itself.
By contrast with British colonial regimes, in Indochina the French willingly committed to a number of major infrastructure projects, especially when such spending could be expected to benefit interests in France (Callis, 1942, pp. 71-74) . So, too, was the Dutch administration in Indonesia more geared than British colonialism to infrastructure development, but only in Java and not the Outer Provinces. There were many Outer Provinces areas that could have opened to export production if railways had been built (Booth, 1998, pp. 5, 151-54) .
The second question stems from the argument that because neither Southeast Asia nor West Africa had well organized, deep capital markets, market failure must, by definition, have existed.
Governments would have to take the lead if the eight countries were to receive greater amounts of foreign capital for social overhead projects. But is this true? The example of Meiji Japan, which began the 1870s with a similar per capita income to most of the eight tropical economies, a currency system described as 'chaotic' (Bank of Japan, n. d., pp. 91-95) and no modern banks, shows how government could encourage financial development and effectively counter market failure. But nothing similar was possible in colonial Southeast Asia or West Africa.
Governments were strongly laissez faire in the area of finance and this effectively ruled out Japanese style state intervention to build national financial institutions. In 1939 Southeast Asian and West African stock markets were still, at best, rudimentary (Huff, 2007) . For lumpy social overhead projects, all of the eight countries had to look to government investment or overseas investors and the latter, Edelstein (1982) shows, demanded the seal of government involvement.
Conclusion
Institutional arrangements and geography have become central to recent thinking on development and historical economics, and analysis of foreign investment in the tropics shows why this should be so (see, for example, Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; Acemoglu, et al., 2002; Rodrik, et al., 2004) . Rapid export expansion in regions of recent European settlement and in important parts of the eight tropical countries had in common the geography of a moving frontier. In the New World migrant labour and foreign capital were drawn to this frontier as complements (Harley, 2000, p. 930; Clemens and Williamson, 2004, p. 333) . But in the tropics migrants could be attracted to frontier areas for no more than a subsistence wage plus some mark up rather than a European standard of living as required in the New World. An important reason why foreign capital did not flow to the eight tropical areas to seek cheap migrant labour was that this labour was so cheap as effectively to substitute for capital so long as natural resources were highly abundant and used in large quantities.
Governments in the tropics could have done more to mobilize natural resource rents through taxation and make use of the revenue to borrow abroad for infrastructure and to invest in Contrary to New World experience, however, in the group of tropical countries analyzed in this article slight foreign investment reflected the very fact of an abundance of natural resources. For social overhead projects local capital market failure left it up to colonial governments in the eight countries to organize investment and foreign capital inflows. But governments, too, largely failed colonial economic development in being overly bound by restrictive fiscal and monetary policies and by a determination to run Empires on the cheap. Table 1 Table 2 Southeast Asia and West Africa tax ratios, 1913-1938 (government revenue as a % of GDP) 
